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  This paper studies the channel coordination between a supplier and a retailer with price and 
sales effort dependent demand. By means of game theory, we analyze price and sales effort 
decisions of the centralized supply chain. Then we consider three different contracts under 
decentralized model, i.e., wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and a two-part tariff 
contract, in which the supplier offers a contract comprising a wholesale price and a lump-sum 
fee to the retailer to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we analyze the results to compare the 
equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios. Our results show that both the 
wholesale price contract and the cost-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain while 
the two-part tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain. 
  © 2015 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction 
 
Faced with more intensified market competition than ever before, the retailers must focus on more 
complicated strategies than simply lowering the price. They have to emphasize the importance of 
non-price factors, such as service, quality or sales effort, which have become more important in 
affecting consumers' purchase decisions (Lu et al., 2011; Tsay & Agrawal, 2000; Boyaci & Gallego, 
2004). The retailers may provide various sales efforts, such as pre-sale and after-sale service, product 
advertising, responsive product repair, in order to increase the attractiveness of the products. A 
parallel stream of literature, represented by McGuire and Staelin (1983), focused on the channel 
coordination problem. Prior studies have discussed a variety of contracts under various environments, 
such as wholesale price (Bernstein et al., 2006), buy-back (Wu, 2011; Hou et al., 2010), revenue 
sharing (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004; Yao et al., 2008; Linh & 
Hong, 2009), quantity flexibility (Sethi et al., 2004; Tsay, 1999), sales-rebate (Wong et al., 2009; 
Taylor, 2002). However, the above literature didn’t address issues about channel coordination with 
price and sales effort dependent demand.  
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Sales effort or service problems have been viewed as an important strategy and have received wide 
attention in the marketing literature and operations literature. Prior studies have examined price and 
service decisions under channel competition (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000; Chen et al., 2008; Bernstein & 
Federgruen, 2004; Dan et al., 2012), optimal coordination design and coordination (Bernstein & 
Federgruen, 2007; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2013a; Krishnan et al., 2004; He et al., 
2009) and effects of the channel power structures (Lu et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2012; Gurnani et al., 
2007; Karray, 2013). Perry and Porter (1990) investigated resale price maintenance by a monopoly 
manufacturer who sells its product through monopolistically competitive retailers when the retailers 
provide service. Tsay and Agrawal (2000) studied a distribution system consisting of a manufacturer 
and two independent retailers under price and service competition. Lu et al. (2011) outlined a game-
theoretic framework to obtain the equilibrium solutions for two competing manufacturers and their 
common retailer when the demand is sensitive to both retail price and manufacturer service. They 
compared results from three supply chain structures: manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg 
and vertical Nash. Ma et al. (2013a) developed models to optimize the retailer’s and the 
manufacturer’s effort levels and profits using different channel strategies. Similarly, Gurnani et al. 
(2007) and Karray (2013) examined the effect of the periodicity of pricing and marketing efforts on 
the equilibrium outcomes. 
 
Some research has begun to emerge in the area of the coordination of supply chain when the demand 
is sensitive to both price and non-price factors. Iyer (1998) analyzed the channel coordination issues 
of manufacturers when retailers compete in price as well as non-price factors such as the provision of 
product information, free repair, faster check-out, or after-sales service. Krishnan et al. (2004) 
investigated coordination contracts for decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort 
and analyzed supply chain coordination by coupling buy-backs with promotional cost-sharing 
agreements, offering unilateral markdown allowances ex post , or placing additional constraints on 
the buy-back. Bernstein and Federgruen (2007) compared the coordination mechanisms when 
retailers compete only in terms of their prices, and when they engage in simultaneous price and 
service competition. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2009) studied a distribution channel in which a 
manufacturer relies on a sales agent for selling the product and for investing in marketing effort. They 
proposed two contract forms: a two-part price schedule specifying a variable wholesale price and a 
fixed franchise fee. He et al. (2009) and Ma et al. (2013b) also investigated the issue of channel 
coordination with effort and price dependent demand. 
 
Our work deals with supply chain coordination when the demand is sensitive to both price and sales 
effort. Unlike previous studies, we model different decision making structures (the centralized supply 
chain and decentralized supply chain) in a supply chain where the retailer undertakes sales effort to 
increase the market demand. In centralized supply chain, the members are managed by a dominant 
decision maker aiming to maximize the total expected profit of the supply chain, while decentralized 
supply chain, each member’s objective is to maximize his own profit. We investigate wholesale price 
contract and cost-sharing contract in the decentralized supply chain model and develop a two-part 
tariff contract to coordinate the supply chain, in which the supplier offers a contract comprising a 
wholesale price and a lump-sum fee to the retailer.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives model description. Section 3 
analyzes the centralized supply chain model. Section 4 examines the decentralized scenario under 
three models of different contracts, i.e., wholesale price contract model, cost-sharing contract model 
and a two-part tariff contract model to coordinate the supply chain. Section 5 analyzes the results to 
compare the equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Model Description 
We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The demand is Q. Li and Z. Liu / Decision Science Letters 4 (2015) 
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assumed to be deterministic and all model parameters are common knowledge for both players. To 
maintain analytical tractability, we don’t consider the retailer’s marginal cost. We discuss price and 
service decisions of players in different models: centralized supply chain, wholesale price contract 
model and cost-sharing contract model. Similar to the prior literature (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000), we 
assume that the demand function is 
 
x bp a D       (1)  
 
Here we assume the demand is more sensitive to price  p than to service  x, that is,    b . 
Furthermore, we assume that, when the retailer provides a sales effort  x, the effort cost is 
2
2
1
rx , 
which assures that the profit function is concave on  x, i.e., improving service has a decreasing return 
on sales effort expenditure (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000). In our model, the supplier is assumed to be the 
leader in the Stackelberg game setting. The supplier determines the wholesale price and the retailer 
decides the retailer price and sales effort. 
3. The centralized supply chain model 
In the centralized supply chain model, the supply chain members seek to maximize the whole supply 
chains’ profit. 
The profit for the centralized supply chain can be expressed as: 
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The utility function  sc   is a concave function on ( p, x) if and only if Hessian matrix is negative 
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Solving the first order condition of Eq.(2), we find the following.  
 
Proposition 1. In the centralized supply chain model, if  0 1  B , then the optimal retail price and sales 
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After substituting Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) into Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we derive the demand and the profit of 
the supplier chain as follows, 
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4. The decentralized supply chain model 
 
4.1 Wholesale price contract model 
In the case of wholesale price contract model, the supplier determines the wholesale price first. The 
retailer observes the wholesale price and makes his/her response to set his/her optimal retail price and 
sales effort as the follower. The profit of the supplier and the retailer can be expressed as follows, 
   30
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Given the wholesale price, the retailer determines  p and  x  to maximize his/her profit, shown as Eq. 
(6). Solving the first order condition for Eq. (6) yields the optimal retail price and sales effort is as 
follows, 
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Substituting Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) into Eq.(5), the supplier's optimal problem becomes 
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Solving the first order condition of Eq. (9), we derive the optimal wholesale price as follows, 
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Proposition 2. In the wholesale price contract model, the optimal wholesale price is 
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Using Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), we derive the demand, the profit of the supplier, the retailer and the 
supply chain. 
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4.2 Cost-sharing contract model 
In the cost-sharing contract model, the supplier shares the retailer’s sales effort cost. 0 < k < 1 is the 
fraction of the effort cost that the supplier pays, while the retailer undertakes the remaining 1 − k 
portion of the cost in sales effort. Thus, the supplier determines the wholesale price and the 
proportion of cost sharing first. The retailer observes the decisions of the supplier and makes his/her 
response to set his/her optimal retail price and sales effort as the follower. The profit of the supplier 
and the retailer can be expressed as follows, 
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(15)
Given the wholesale price and the proportion of cost sharing, the retailer determines  p and  x  to 
maximize his/her profit, shown as Eq. (15). Solving the first order condition of Eq. (15), we find that 
the optimal retail price and sales effort is as follows, 
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Substituting Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) into Eq.(14), the supplier's profit becomes 
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Solving the first order condition of Eq. (18), we derive the optimal wholesale price and the optimal 
proportion of cost sharing as follows, 
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After substituting Eq. (19) and Eq. (20) into Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), we derive the following. 
Proposition 3. In the cost-sharing contract model, then the optimal wholesale price and proportion of 
cost sharing is follows, 
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and the optimal retail price and sales effort are as follows, 
) 16 9 (
6 3 4 12
2
2 2 2
*
rb b
bc a c rb rab
p
cs
 
  


 
, 
 
(23)  
br
bc a
x
cs
16 9
) ( 6
2
*
 




.  (24)  
   
From Eq. (23) and Eq. (24), we derive the demand, the profit of the supplier, the retailer and the 
supply chain. 
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4.3 Two-part tariff contract model 
We propose a simple two-part tariff contract, (F, w), to coordinate the supply chain in which the 
supplier charges the retailer a wholesale price along with a lump-sum fee. Such a contract can prompt 
the supplier to lower the wholesale price in exchange for a fixed payment (Ma et al., 2013a). In 
addition, the wholesale price is higher than the unit marginal cost of the supplier. With the two-part 
tariff contract, the profits of the supplier and the retailer are as follows, 
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Substituting the values of 
* c x  into the above equation, we get   32
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Since the retailer has to make positive profit, we get 
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Proposition 4. The two-part tariff contract between the supplier and retailer given by  c w   and 
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  coordinates the supply chain in the decentralized supply chain strategy. 
Proposition 4 suggests that the supplier would charge a wholesale price that is just sufficient to 
recover its unit marginal cost. Thus, the retailer has incentives to lower the retail price. However, the 
supplier would boost its profits through the fixed fee. The upper bound on the fixed fee (F) ensures 
that the retailer would participate in the contract. In addition, the lower bound on fixed fee (F) keeps 
the fixed fee contract non-negative. The two-part tariff contract is the outcome of a bargaining 
process for the supply chain members. When the supplier and the retailer agree to share the total 
profit of the supply chain, they negotiate the value of the contract parameter F that is transferred from 
the retailer to the supplier. The fixed fee F will depend on the relative channel bargaining power that 
each member carries.  
5. Analysis 
In this section, we compare the optimal retail price, sales effort, demand and the supply chain profit 
of the three models: centralized supply chain, wholesale price contract model and cost-sharing 
contract model. For the ease of analysis, we summarize in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Summary of the equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios 
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Proposition 5. In centralized supply chain model, the retail price is the lowest; the retail price of cost-
sharing contract model comes second; in wholesale price contract model, the retail price is the 
highest. Q. Li and Z. Liu / Decision Science Letters 4 (2015) 
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(2) Sales effort 
* * * wp cs c x x x    
Proposition 6. The centralized supply chain gets the highest sales effort; the cost-sharing contract 
model comes second; the sales effort of the wholesale price contract model is the lowest. 
(3) Demand 
* * * wp cs c D D D    
Corollary 1. The demand in centralized supply chain is the highest; the cost-sharing contract model 
comes second; in wholesale price contract model, the demand is the lowest. 
(4) The supply chain profit  
* * * wp
sc
cs
sc
c
sc       
Corollary 2. The centralized supply chain achieves the highest total supply chain profit; the cost-
sharing contract model comes second; in wholesale price contract model, the supply chain profit is 
the lowest. 
6. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the issue of supply chain coordination between a supplier and a retailer with price 
and sales effort dependent demand. By means of game theory, we have analyzed two distinct channel 
structures: centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain. We have studied price and sales 
effort decisions of the centralized supply chain, in which the members aim to maximize the total 
expected profit of the supply chain. Then we consider three different contracts under decentralized 
model, i.e., wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and a two-part tariff contract, in which the 
supplier offers a contract comprising a wholesale price and a lump-sum fee to the retailer. Finally, we 
have analyzed the results to compare the equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios. Our 
results have shown that both the wholesale price contract and the cost-sharing contract could not 
coordinate the supply chain. We have found that the centralized supply chain could achieve the lowest 
retail price, the highest sales effort, the highest demand and the highest total supply chain profit; the 
cost-sharing contract model comes second; in wholesale price contract model, the retail price was the 
highest and the sales effort, demand and the total supply chain profit were the lowest. Furthermore, 
the two-part tariff contract could effectively coordinate the supply chain. 
 
There are several directions for future research. First, we assume a linear demand function and certain 
demand, the incorporation of non-linear demand function and demand uncertainty would provide 
even richer results in this framework. Secondly, we can extend this case to the supply chain with two 
competitive retailers or two competitive supply chains. Finally, this paper assumes that the sales effort 
of the retailer is common knowledge, extending this model by considering a system with asymmetric 
information may yield some more interesting results. 
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